

## 2020 MediFor Challenge Evaluation Overview

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), Dr. Haiying Guan (Co-PI), Dr. Yooyoung Lee, Dr. Amy Yates<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin

Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

April 21-25, 2020

#### Disclaimer

- Certain commercial equipment, instruments, software, or materials are identified in this article in order to specify the experimental procedure adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the equipment, instruments, software or materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
- The views, opinions and/or findings expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
- All images, graphs, and charts are original works created for DARPA MediFor Program.




#### Thanks to the Test and Evaluation Team!

- Program Administration
  - DARPA Media Forensic (MediFor) Team
- TA3 Data Production and Curation
  - PAR Government
  - National Center for Media Forensics, University of Colorado Denver
  - RankOne
  - Rochester Institute of Technology
  - Drexel University
  - University of Michigan

- Container Execution
  - Data Machines Incorporated
- MediFor Demo System
  - Next Century
- Contracting
  - Air Force Research Lab
- Evaluation Design and Implementation
  - NIST MediFor Team

## Media Forensic Challenge (MFC) Overview Outline


- MediFor evaluation requirements and challenges
- MediFor common evaluation tasks
- Holistic vs. "Opt-In" technologies
- Manipulation journaling for data production
- Understanding System Performance with Factor Analysis
- MediFor Data Set Summary
- MFC20 results preview



# MediFor Evaluation Requirements and Challenges

## Media Forensic Evaluation Requirements and Challenges

- 4<sup>th</sup> MediFor Program Evaluations 2017-2020
- Program requirements from the initial kickoff
  - Support as many common evaluations as possible
  - Support evaluation of integrity indicators (TA1) via a selectable menu
  - Support evaluation of integrity reasoning over indicators (TA2)
  - Understand system performance
- Fundamental metrology challenges from the modest starting point
  - Metrology for holistic vs. "Opt-In" media forensic systems
  - Manipulation journaling for data production
  - Factor Analysis: selective scoring vs. Special collections
  - Take Home vs. Container evaluations



## Six Common MediFor Evaluation Tasks

### Media Forensics Challenge Evaluation Task Overview

#### Single File Authenticity

#### **Manipulation Detection:**

Is the image/video manipulated?

#### Localization:

Where is the image/video manipulated?

- Spatial
- Temporal
- Temporal-spatial

#### **Authenticity in Context**

## Image Pair Authenticity

#### **Splice Detection:**

Does image1 contain some of image2?

#### **Localization:**

Where in image1 was image2 content spliced?

Where in image2 is the splice donor?

#### Image+

#### Image Collection

**Provenance Filtering:** 

Find related images

## Provenance Graph Building:

Construct a phylogeny graph of related images

#### File+Camera

#### Camera Verification:

Was an image/video taken by a known camera?


#### File+Event

#### **Event Verification:**

Was an image capture during a known event?




## Image Manipulation Detection and Localization



#### **Detection Metrics**

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)

- Area Under the Curve (AUC)
- Correct Detection (CD) at False Alarm Rate 5%




#### **Localization Metrics**

Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)

Symmetric Range: [-1:1]


- 1 denotes perfect accuracy
- 0 denotes no correlation
- -1 denotes perfect inaccuracy.




$$TP \times TN - FP \times FN$$

$$\sqrt{(TP+FP)\cdot (TP+FN)\cdot (TN+FP)\cdot (TN+FN)}$$

## Splice Manipulation Detection and Localization



## Provenance Filtering and Graph Building



#### **Metrics**

#### Filtering:

Recall First 300/200/100/50
$$recall = \frac{|\{relevant\} \cap \{retrieved\}|}{|\{relevant\}|}$$

#### **Graph Building:**

Generalized F-measure:

$$sim_{NLO}(G_r, G_s) = 2 \frac{|V_r \cap V_s| + |E_r \cap E_s|}{|V_r| + |V_s| + |E_r| + |E_s|}$$

#### Camera ID Verification Task

- Task: Determine if a probe is from a claimed camera.
  - If manipulated, localize the changes.



#### **Event Verification Task**

Task Definition: Given a collection of images and videos from the event,
 determine if a probe is from the claimed event.

#### MFC20 Events

• 12 events: hurricane\_matthew, hurricane\_sandy, hurricane\_harvey, hurricane\_katrina, hurricane\_Irma, hurricane\_Ike, oshkosh2011, oshkosh2010, berlin\_air\_show, berlin\_marathon, chinese\_new\_year\_london\_2014, chicago\_blizzard\_2011.



oshkosh2011



oshkosh2010



hurricane katrina



hurricane\_ike



berlin marathon



chicago\_blizzard\_2011

## Video Manipulation Detection and Temporal Localization

- Video Detection metrics
  - Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
  - Area Under the Curve (AUC)
  - Correct Detection (CD) at False Alarm Rate (FAR) of 5%
- Video Temporal Localization
  - Metrics: Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC)





Figure: Video Temporal Detection and Localization



## Holistic vs. Opt-In Technologies

## Holistic vs. Opt In Technologies


#### Evaluation challenge:

- Some media forensic systems determine a response should not be returned
  - E.g., face illumination consistency systems should not respond if no face was found the image

<b>Probe Status</b>	Description
Processed	probe was fully processed
OptOut	the system <u>determined</u> a response should not be returned
OptOutLocalization	the system, <u>determined</u> a detection response but not a localization response should be returned
NonProcessed	A system failure of some kind occurred and will be scored with low probability

#### • NIST reports:

- Holistic performance measures: score all trials
- Opt In performance measures:
  - Trial Response Rate (TRR) Percent of processed, NonProcessed, and FailedValidation images
  - Performance measures excluding opt'd out probes



## Manipulation Journaling for Data Production

## Manipulation Journaling: Describing Manipulations

#### Challenge:

- Post manipulation interpretation of imagery changes is nearly impossible
- Effective evaluations require knowledge:
  - Where the manipulation occurred
  - What tool was used
  - What operation was used
  - Semantics of the manipulation: remove vs. add

#### MediFor Approach:

- Record steps with PAR's Journaling Tool
- Automate collection of localization








## Manipulation Journaling - Operation Logging

Base Image




High Provenance








*Unknown Provenance* 






Final Manipulated Image

## Manipulation Journaling – Journal Expansion





# Understanding System Performance with Factor Analysis

## Factor Analysis: Selective Scoring vs. Replicate Trials

- Core challenge: the combinatorics of manipulation
  - Suppose a 2-Factorial, single operation experimental design
    - 17,500 images = 70 Operations \* 2 levels \* 125 examples
    - Not realistic (manipulators routinely stack manipulations)
  - The average graph depth in MFC '19 was ~4
    - $6.0*10^9$  images =  $70^4$  Operations \* 2 levels \* 125 examples
    - Laughably over execution budget
- MediFor data production approaches:
  - Human's build realistic manipulations
  - Automatically extend journals with final node variations
  - Semi- and fully- automatic journal creation
- MediFor performance analysis approaches:
  - Overall manipulation performance
  - Selective Scoring Analysis
  - Special Study Analysis





## Factor Analysis: Selective Scoring

- Selective Scoring approach:
  - Non-Targets: Unmanipulated probes of known provenance
  - Targets: Manipulated probes containing the selected manipulations
- Strength of approach:
  - Insight into the effect of manipulation type on performance
- Weakness of the approach:
  - Confounding factors not controlled.

### MFC20 Image Selective Scoring Queries

Name	Definition			
Splice	Any operation that takes a region from a donor media and pastes it into a probe			
Clone	Pixels are sampled from the image and pasted back in different area of the image			
Splice/Clone	Pixels are pasted within or between the images			
Сгор	Outer pixel regions from a probe image are removed			
Resize	Image dimensions from a probe image are changed			
Intensity	A range of intensity pixel values is changed			
Antiforensic	Any techniques that erase processing history of image manipulations			
Antiforensic-PRNU	Any techniques that use PRNU			
Antiforensic-CFA	Any techniques that use CFA			
Social Media	Any techniques that use social media related operations			
Global Blur/Smooth	Any techniques that use a low-pass filter (globally) to remove outlier pixels (e.g., noise)			
Local Blur/Smooth	Any techniques that use a low-pass filter (locally) to remove outlier pixels (e.g., noise)			
GAN	Any operations that use GAN-based techinques locally/globally			
NonGAN-CGI	Any operations that use non-GAN CGI			
Distortion	Deformation of images			
Remove	Remove a set of pixels.			
Face Manipulation	Any manipulation done to a face.			
All	All data without selective scoring			





Similar Performance, Different Variance

## Factor Analysis: Special Studies


- Special Study approach:
  - Build specific data sets to answer specific performance assessment questions.
  - Enables two new views of performance assessment
    - Operation Only Detection
    - Facet Detection
- MFC20 Special Studies
  - Image
    - Compression
    - Global Blur
    - Social Media Laundering Image
    - Single Operation (Paste-Splice)
  - Video
    - Frame Drop/Duplication
    - Social Media Laundering Video

## Compression Study Example:

#### 7 Conditions: 1: EXIF Copy

3: Adobe Levels (6,8,10)


3: ImageMagick Levels (60,80,90)



trainmodel9b-mfc20ev1-nores-nonorm-mfc19-tron-mfc171819-ep-75 90 80 Detection Rate [%] Red=Normal Probe Comp\_Factor == ['AntiForensicExifQuantizationTable'] (AUC Comp Factor == [ Adobe-Qual06 ] (AUC: 0.85, T#: 135, NT: Comp Factor == [ 'Adobe-Qual08'] (AUC: 0.83, T#: 137, NT 30 Comp Factor == [ 'Adobe Qual10'] (AUC: 0.8, T#: 137, NT# Comp Factor == ['ImageMagick-Qual60'] (AUC: 0.9, T#: 13 Comp\_Factor == ['ImageMagick-Qual80'] (AUC: 0.75, T#: 1 20 - Comp Factor == ['ImageMagick-Qual90'] (AUC: 0.78, T#: 1 10 10 20 40 50 70 80 90 False Alarm Rate [%]

Mayachitra #2516

#### Take Home vs. Container Evaluations



 Integration by TA2 requires access to algorithms for training

#### • History:

- MFC '18, Data Machines Inc. completed a proof of concept to accept containers and processing data
- MFC '19, Image Manip. Detection and Loc. and Video Manip. Detection and Temporal Loc., TA2 tested with delivered containers
- MFC '20: Added Video Spatial Localization,
   Provenance Tasks, and Camera Verification

## **NIST MFC Scoring Server**

 Performers had access to an automated scoring server

• 65 MFC Data sets


Supports 6 evaluation tasks


 Over 2596 submissions (1170 Active)

• 12142 scoring runs



Distribution of Submissions per Team: TakeHome (Orange) and Container (Blue)





# Media Forensic Challenge (MFC) Evaluation Datasets

## MFC Image and Video Data Sets for Detection

NIST Data Sets	lr	nage	Video		
	Probe	Journal	Probe	Journal	
NC17 EvalPart1	4,000	406	360	47	
MFC18 EvalPart1	17,000	758	1,000	114	
MFC19 EvalPart1	16,000	1383	1,500	163	
MFC20 EvalPart1	20,000	2536	2,500	217	

## MFC Image Data Sets for Provenance Tasks


NIST Data Sets	Image Probe	Image Journal	World
NC17 EvalPart1	1K	406	1M
MFC18 EvalPart1	10K	641	1M
MFC19 EvalPart1	9420	1025	2M
MFC20 EvalPart1 2M	5926	1571	2M

## MFC Image Date Sets for Splice Detection.

NIST Splice Data Sets	Image Probe	Image Journal
NC17 EvalPart1	329K	156
MFC18 EvalPart1	18K	381
MFC19 EvalPart1	18K	621
MFC20 EvalPart1	18K	1266

### MFC Data Sets for Camera Verification

			MFC18			MFC19			MFC20	
Test	Train	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.
Image	Image	5275	39	452	8804	73	844	11288	106	1454
	Video	3383	25	410	6845	57	802	9346	88	1411
	Multimedia	3383	25	410	6845	57	802	9346	88	1411
Video	Image	289	11	67	351	23	81	788	35	87
	Video	289	11	67	337	22	81	767	34	87
	Multimedia	289	11	67	337	22	81	767	34	87



## Select MFC20 Results Preview

## MFC20 Team and Task Participation Summary


#### **Image Systems**

	Camera	Event	Manipulation	Provenance Filtering	Provenance Graph Building	Splice
Binghamton	1					
Honeywell FIBBER			15			
Kitware			11			1
Kitware_Berkeley			1			
Kitware_Columbia				1	1	
Kitware_UAlbany			2			
Mayachitra		6	34			
Purdue_NotreDame				1	1	
Purdue_Polimi			9			
Purdue_TA11a			4			
SRI-PRNU-TA1	1		2			
UMD			4			
USCISI			2	1	1	
USCISI-TA1.1			16			
USCISI-TA1.2			2			


#### Video Systems

	Camera Verification	Manipulation
Kitware		8
Kitware_UAlbany		1
NYU		8
Purdue_Polimi		2
SRI-PRNU-TA1	2	1
UMD		1
UNIFI		2
USCISI-TA1.1		2
USCISI-TA1.2		1


### Image Manipulation Detection: NC17-MFC20



### Video Manipulation Detection: NC17-MFC20




### Provenance Graph Building: NC17-MFC20



NIST Data Sets	Probe	World
NC17 EvalPart1	1K	1M
MFC18 EvalPart1	10K	1M
MFC19 EvalPart1	9420	2M
MFC20 EvalPart1	5926	2M

### MFC Overview Summary and What's Next

- Introduced the 6 common evaluation task for the MediFor Program
- Introduced the data creation approach for the MediFor Program
- Subsequent NIST talks during this meeting will be deep dives
- This is the final MediFor evaluation; NIST has plans to continue open evaluations of media forensic systems. Details to follow.




# MFC20 Image Evaluation Results Deep Dive

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), **Dr. Haiying Guan** (Co-PI), Dr. Yooyoung Lee, **Dr. Amy Yates**<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin


Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

April 21-25, 2020




# Image Manipulation Detection and Localization


### Image Manipulation Detection and Localization



#### **Metrics**

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Correct Detection (CD) at False Alarm Rate 5%







Manipulated image
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)


### **Detection System Evaluation Metrics**

- Evaluate the accuracy of a system output (e.g., confidence score)
- Evaluation metrics
  - ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic)
  - AUC (Area Under Curve)
  - CD (Correct Detection) @ FAR = 0.05
  - EER (Equal Error Rate)



### MFC Evaluation Dataset History








New Manipulations (CGI, Recapture, ...)
Extended JT, AutoJT


**MFC 2018** 






- Camera ID Eval. datasets
- Video Temporal Spatial
- Additional Manipulation Operations (GAN etc.)
- Extended JT, AutoJT

**MFC 2019** 





### Special study data

- Compression
- Global Blur
- Single Operation
- Social Media Laundering
- Frame Drop/Dup.

**MFC 2020** 

# MFC Image Evaluation Open Dataset Summary

NIST Data Sets	Image Probe	Image Journal	Date
NC17 EvalPart1	4K	406	06/2017
MFC18 EvalPart1	17K	758	03/2018
MFC19 EvalPart1	16K	1383	03/2019
MFC20 EvalPart1	20K	2536	03/2020

### Holistic vs. Opt In Technologies

- Allowing Systems to Respond When/If Appropriate
- Evaluation challenge:
  - Some media forensic systems determine a response should not be returned
    - E.g., face illumination consistency systems should not respond if no face was found the image


<b>Probe Status</b>	Description
Processed	probe was fully processed
OptOut	the system <u>determined</u> a response should not be returned
OptOutLocalization	the system, <u>determined</u> a detection response but not a localization response should be returned
NonProcessed	A system failure of some kind occurred and will be scored with low probability

### • NIST reports:

- Holistic performance measures: score all trials
- Opt In performance measures:
  - Trial Response Rate (TRR) Percent of processed, NonProcessed, and FailedValidation images
  - Performance measures excluding opt'd out probes

### Image Manipulation Detection Results: Full Data

- 20K probe images
- 12 teams:
  - Honeywell FIBBER
  - Kitware Berkeley
  - Kitware UAlbany
  - Kitware
  - Mayachitra
  - Purdue\_Polimi
  - Purdue TA11a
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
  - UMD
  - USCISI-TA1.1
  - USCISI-TA1.2
  - USCISI
- 82 image detection systems as 04/09/2020.



- Team ID: Mayachitra
  - AUC 0.81384;
  - System ID: trainmodel9b-mfc20ev1nores-nonorm-adam-def-apr2020-mfc19hor-ver-tron-mfc171819-ep-40
- Team ID: Purdue\_Polimi
  - AUC 0.81; (CD@0.05FA = 0.436)
  - System ID: mfc20-purdue-polimi-gmatrix





Figure: TA1 system MFC20 EP1, All probes (regardless of OptIn)

### Image Manipulation Detection Results: Opt In (1)

- OptIn Systems on MFC20 EP1:
  - 77 systems as 04/09/2020
  - Highest AUC:
    - AUC 0.855; (<u>CD@0.05FA</u> = 0.47, TRR = 0.63)
    - Team ID: Purdue\_Polimi
    - System ID: purdue-polimi-qmatrixnon-compressed\_2020-01-20T17-36-05f470000



## Image Manipulation Detection Results: Opt In (2)





Figure: Image detection Opt In system Area Under the Curve (AUC) vs. Trial Response Rate (TRR) on MFC20 EP1 Image dataset (each point is an analytic system)

### Factor Analysis: Selective Scoring

- Evaluate the system performance on a certain type of data
- Manipulation Detection (MD)
  - Target = Any manipulated media (image or video)
  - NonTarget = HP media
- Selective Scoring on Manipulation Detection (S-MD)
  - Target = Media contains defined manipulations; other operations may also be present in the media
  - NonTarget = HP media


### Image Manipulation Detection Results

- Selective Scoring on GlobalBlurSmooth (Full Data)
- MFC20 EP1
- Selective Scoring on GlobalBlurSmooth
- 14 systems as 04/09/2020
- Highest AUC:
  - AUC 0.802; (CD@0.05FA = 0.191)
  - Team ID: Honeywell FIBBER
  - System ID: p-inhnoi\_2020
- Highest CD@0.05FA:
  - AUC 0.771; (CD@0.05FA = 0.293)
  - Team ID: Mayachitra
  - System ID: trainmodel9b-mfc20ev1-noresnonorm-mfc19-hvhv-fusn-tronmfc171819mfcgb-ep-50




### Image Manipulation Detection Results

- Selective Scoring on SocialMedia (Opt In)
- MFC20 EP1
- Selective Scoring on SocialMedia (Opt In)
- 10 systems as 04/09/2020
- Highest AUC:
  - AUC 0.954; (CD@0.05FA = 0.766, TRR = 0.27)
  - Team ID: Kitware
  - System ID: Kitware-Holistic-V20-MFC20\_EvalPart1\_Image\_Ver1




### Image Manipulation Detection Results


- Selective Scoring: GlobalIntensityNormalization (Opt In)
- MFC20 EP1
- Selective Scoring on GlobalIntensityNormalization (Opt In)
  - 23 systems as 04/09/2020
- Highest AUC:
  - AUC 0.928; (CD@0.05FA = 0.674, TRR = 0.32)
  - Team ID: Mayachitra
  - System ID: trainmodel9b-mfc20ev1nores-nonorm-mfc19-hvhv-fusn-tronmfc171819mfcgb-ep-50



### Image Manipulation Detection System - Team Performance Comparison Across Years




# Image Manipulation Detection System - Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Opt In)



### Image Manipulation Detection System

- Best Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Full Data, ImageOnly)




### Image Localization Task

- Jpeg 2000 composite mask
  - Distinct manipulations are recorded in the different layers in Jpeg2000 mask file respectively.
  - Each bit in a byte for a pixel in a single-layer image represents one localizable manipulation.
  - Scoring can thus be extended to specific localizable manipulations in the image.



Manipulated Probe image



Composite mask

Sequence	Operation	Purpose	Color	Evaluated
5	ContentAwareFill	remove		Y
4	PasteSampled	heal		Y
3	PasteSplice	add		Y
2	Blur			Y

An animated representation of the information stored by the JPEG2000. Every region is fully represented. The sequence is listed in descending order for node distance from the manipulated probe and may be distinct from the bit placement in the byte.

### Image Localization Selective Scoring

- The JPEG2000 masks encode bits that can be used to store information from multiple overlapping manipulations.
- Scoring can now be done on manipulations from any recorded layer.
- Example of selective scoring query:
  - Operation == ['PasteSplice'] or (Operation == ['PasteSampled'] and Purpose == ['Clone'])









**Content Aware Fill** 

**Paste Sampled** 

Paste Splice

Blur

### Image Localization Metrics

### Metrics

Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)

$$MCC = \frac{TP \times TN - FP \times FN}{\sqrt{(TP + FP) \cdot (TP + FN) \cdot (TN + FP) \cdot (TN + FN)}} \in [-1,1]$$


- 1 denotes perfect accuracy
- 0 denotes no correlation
- -1 denotes perfect inaccuracy.
- Optimum MCC
  - The MCC at the optimum grey-scale mask thresho
- Only evaluates on true targets



Probe + ref. mask overlay



System output mask



Color-coded scoring confusion matrix

### Image Manipulation Localization Container Results

### • 8 teams:

- Honeywell FIBBER
- Kitware
- Purdue\_TA11a
- SRI-PRNU-TA1
- UMD
- USCISI-TA1.1
- USCISI-TA1.2
- USCISI

### • 21 image localization systems as 04/09/2020:

- Highest MCC = 0.247;
- TRR = 0.939191
- Team ID: USCISI-TA1.1
- System ID: noiseprint-loc-3\_2019-03-08T15-18-11f736000

### Image Manipulation Localization Container Results: Opt In





Figure: Image localization OptIn system Optimum MCC vs. TRR performance on MFC20 EP1 Image dataset

## Image Localization Evaluation Example: Manipulation Mask



Manipulated



Manipulated Region Mask



	1		
D	OI	าด	ור


Sequence	BitPlane	Operation	Purpose	Color	Evaluated
6		OutputPng			Y
5	1	PasteSplice	add		Y
4	2	Blur			Y
3	3	ColorBalance			Y
2	4	ContentAwareFill	remove		Y
1		AntiForensicJPGCompression			Y

**Manipulation Operation** 



Overlay of manipulated region mask

### Image Localization Evaluation Example: Journal Graph




4/21-25/20


### Image Localization Evaluation Example: Localization System




Overlay of manipulated region mask



Manipulated Region Mask



System localization output



**Evaluation Results** 

Optimum Threshold: 29

Localization Metrics	Optimum
Nimble Mask Metric (NMM)	0.029
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)	0.699
Binary Weighted L1 Loss (BWL1)	0.048
Grayscale Weighted L1 Loss (GWL1)	0.095

Total Pixels (N): 20621162

Confuson Measures	OptimumPixelCount	OptimumProportion
True Postives (TP: green)	1052791	0.051
False Postives (FP: red)	0	0.000
True Negatives (TN: white)	18575635	0.901
False Negatives (FN: blue)	992736	0.048

No-Score Measures	Pixels	Proportion
Boundary No-Score Zone (BNS: yellow):	405142	0.019
Selective No-Score Zone ( NS: pink):	0	0.000
System Opt Out No-Score Zone (PNS: purple):	0	0.000
Total No-Score Zone:	405142	0.019

Image Manipulation Localization System - Team Performance Comparison Across Years







Image Manipulation Localization System - Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Opt In)





# Splice Manipulation Detection and Localization Outline

### Splice Manipulation Detection and Localization




## Splice Localization Mask Example

Color Composite Mask



Probe Image





Base Image





**Donor Image** 



Donor Mask




## MFC Image Splice Evaluation Open Dataset Summary

NIST Splice Data Sets	Probe Pair	Image Journal	Date
NC17 EvalPart1	329K	156	06/2017
MFC18 EvalPart1	18K	381	03/2018
MFC19 EvalPart1	18K	621	03/2019
MFC20 EvalPart1	18K	1266	03/2020

### Image Splice Manipulation Detection Container Results


- 18K probe images
- 1 teams on detection system as 04/09/2020:
- Team ID: Kitware
- System ID: Kitware-Holistic-Splice-MFC20\_EvalPart1\_Image\_Ver1
- FullData
  - AUC = 0.603
  - CD@0.05FA = 0.126
  - TRR = 1.0
- Optln:
  - AUC = 0.653
  - CD@0.05FA = 0.139
  - TRR = 0.96




Splice Manipulation Detection System - Team Performance Comparison Across Years

(Full Data)

Image Splice Detection System Team Performance Comparison Across Years







# Image Manipulation and Splice Detection and Localization Analysis

#### Image Detection

#### At least 200 probes



## Effect of Manipulation Count on Detection




Lower = Better

Manipulation Count	Mean Rank
7	2.76
8	2.95
6	3.65
2	4.51
3	5.11
5	5.11
1	5.95
4	5.97

1 1 3 3 5 5 7 7 2 2 4 4 6 6 8 8


## Effect of Operation on Detection




Operation	Mean Rank
Exposure	8.43
Hue	8.65
Tr Distort	8.92
Add Noise	9.01
Normalization	9.74
Sel Remove	10.02
GAN Fill	10.04
Blur IPM	10.44
Saturation	10.57
Color Balance	10.61
Vibrance	11.05
Paste Sample	12.06

Operation	Mean Rank
Levels	12.07
Contrast	12.31
C Aware Fill	12.89
Tr Resize	13.11
CGI Fill	13.17
Tr Warp	13.43
Tr Rotate	14.73
Blur	15.29
Dig Pen Draw	15.75
Paste Splice	17.52
Tr Crop	19.08
Art Shadow	21.11


#### **Detection Teams**



#### Image Localization




#### Effect of Operation on Localization



Operation	Mean Rank
Paste Sample	7.33
Sel Remove	7.57
Blur	8.76
Levels	9.14
Saturation	9.62
Paste Splice	9.67
Hue	9.76
Tr Resize	11.29
Vibrance	11.86
Add Noise	11.90
C Aware Fill	11.95
Contrast	12.05

Operation	Mean Rank
Art Shadow	12.10
Exposure	12.76
Color Balance	13.52
Tr Distort	13.86
Tr Rotate	13.90
Tr Warp	14.19
Blur IPM	15.00
Tr Crop	15.17
Normalization	15.64
Dig Pen Draw	15.86
CGI Fill	17.14
GAN Fill	19.95

#### **Localization Teams**



OptimumMCC

#### **Image Special Studies**


- Image Studies
  - Compression
  - Global Blur
  - Single Operation
  - Social Media Laundering Image

#### **Study Condition Definition**


- Manipulation Detection (MD)
  - Target = Any manipulated image
  - Non-Target = HP media
- Operation-Only Detection (OOD)
  - Target = Only image with operation of interest; no other operations are present
  - Non-Target = HP media

## Image Manipulation Detection Special Study

- Compression Results (MD)
- 2 software approaches:
  - Adobe Photoshop
  - ImageMagick
- 3 compression levels for each approach:
  - Adobe (YesRGB): 6, 8, 10
  - ImageMagick: 60, 80, 90



## Compression Factor (MD)



#### Lower = Better

Compression Factor	Mean Rank
AP: Qual 6	2.74
IM: Qual 60	2.77
AP: Qual 8	3.52
AP: Qual 10	4.54
IM: Qual 80	4.58
IM: Qual 90	4.64
EXIF Copy	5.22

AP06 Photoshop (Q:06) AP10 Photoshop (Q:10) IM60 ImageMagick (Q:60) IM90 ImageMagick (Q:90)


AP08 Photoshop (Q:08) EC EXIF Copy IM80 ImageMagick (Q:80)

## Image Manipulation Detection Special StudyGlobal Blur Results (MD)


#### Blur types:

- Gaussian Blur Std (GBS)
- Median Blur Pixel (MedBP)
- Median Blur Impulse Preserving (MedBIP)
- Motion Blur (MotB)
- Box Blur (BoxB)
- Anti-Forensics
  - Global Blur (GB)
  - GB + PRNU
  - GB + PRNU + Camera Mod

#### All study probes



## Blur Type (MD)




Lower = Better

Blur Type	Mean Rank
GBS	2.32
BoxB	2.65
MedBP	3.08
MotB	3.20
MedBIP	3.75

BoxB Box Blur GBS Gaussian Blur Std/ledBIfMedian Blur Impulse Preserving/ledBFMedian Blur Pixel MotB Motion Blur

## Global Blur Anti-Forensics (MD)



#### Lower = Better

Anti-	Mean
Forensics	Rank
GB	1.44
GB+PRNU	2.02
GB+PRNU	2.54
+Cam	


GB Global Blur EXIF CopyPRNUGB + PRNURNU+GB + PRNU + Camera Model

## Image Manipulation Detection Special StudySocial Media Laundering (Image) Results (MD)

#### 5 Scenarios

- Scenario 1: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, mobile download
- Scenario 2: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - desktop upload, mobile download
- Scenario 3: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, desktop download
- Scenario 4: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - desktop upload, desktop download
- Scenario 5: Instagram (Synthetic)
  - · mobile upload, mobile download

#### All study probes







## Image Manipulation Detection Special StudySocial Media Laundering (Image) Results (OOD)

#### 5 Scenarios

- Scenario 1: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, mobile download
- Scenario 2: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - · desktop upload, mobile download
- Scenario 3: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, desktop download
- Scenario 4: Facebook (Synthetic)
  - desktop upload, desktop download
- Scenario 5: Instagram (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, mobile download



## Social Media Factor (MD)





Lower = Better

SM Factor	Mean Rank
FB 1	2.41
FB 2	2.61
FB 3	2.61
IG 5	3.33
FB 4	4.04

FB1 Facebook (Scenario 1) FB2 Facebook (Scenario 2) FB3 Facebook (Scenario 3) FB4 Facebook (Scenario 4) IG5 Instagram (Scenario 5)

## **Splice Detection**





## MFC20 Video Evaluation Results Deep Dive

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), Dr. Haiying Guan (Co-PI), Dr. Yooyoung Lee, Dr. Amy Yates<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin

Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

April 21-25, 2020


#### Video Detection and Localization Outline

- Task definition
- Evaluation dataset
- MFC20 Video Detection and Localization results
- MFC20 Video Detection and Localization result analysis

## Video Manipulation Detection and Temporal Localization

- Video Detection metrics
  - Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
  - Area Under the Curve (AUC)
  - Correct Detection (CD) at False Alarm Rate (FAR) of 5%
- Video Temporal Localization

• Metrics: Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC)  $\frac{TP \times TN - FP \times FN}{\sqrt{(TP + FP) \cdot (TP + FN) \cdot (TN + FP)} \cdot (TN + FN)} \in [-1,1]$ 



Modification detected by the system

Figure: Video Temporal Detection and Localization

## MFC Video Evaluation Open Dataset Summary

NIST Data Sets	Video Probe	Video Journal	Date
NC17 EvalPart 1	360	47	06/2017
MFC18 EvalPart1	1K	114	03/2018
MFC19 EvalPart1	1.5K	163	03/2019
MFC20 EvalPart1	2K	217	03/2020


#### Video Detection Task Participation

- 2K Probes:
- 9 teams:
  - Kitware\_UAlbany
  - Kitware
  - NYU
  - Purdue\_Polimi
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
  - UMD
  - UNIFI
  - USCISI-TA1.1
  - USCISI-TA1.2

- Two Evaluation Conditions:
  - Video Only
  - Video with MetaData
- Two Special Collections
  - Frame Drop/Duplication
  - Social Media Laundering Video

## Video Detection Performance: Video Only, Full Data


- 23 video detection systems:
- Highest AUC & CD@0.05FA:
  - AUC = 0.921; (<u>CD@0.05FA</u> = 0.269)
  - Team ID: Purdue\_Polimi
  - System ID: purdue-polimi-videocodec-base-new\_2020-01-30T21-38-26f154000



## Video Detection Performance: Video Only, Opt-In

- 19 video detection systems
- Highest AUC & CD@0.05FA
  - AUC = 0.92; (CD@0.05FA = 0.269)
  - TRR = 0.68
  - Team ID: Purdue\_Polimi
  - System ID: purdue-polimi-videocodec-base-new\_2020-01-30T21-38-26f154000

#### MFC20 Video EvalPart1




## Video Detection Performance: Video + Metadata, Full Data

#### • 2 teams:

- Purdue\_Polimi
- UNIFI
- Highest AUC & CD@0.05FA:
  - AUC = 0.987; (CD@0.05FA = 0.939)
  - Team ID: UNIFI
  - System ID: unifi-ed209\_2019-09-04T10-59-29f055000

#### MFC20 Video EvalPart1




## Video Detection Performance: Video + Metadata, Opt-In

#### • 2 teams:

- Purdue\_Polimi
- UNIFI
- Highest AUC & CD@0.05FA:
  - AUC = 0.991; (CD@0.05FA = 0.919)
  - Team ID: UNIFI
  - System ID: unifi-ed209\_2019-09-04T10-59-29f055000

#### MFC20 Video EvalPart1



## Video Manipulation Detection Container Results

- Opt In on MFC20 EP1, Video Only condition







Figure: Video detection, Video Only condition, Opt In system Area Under the Curve (AUC) vs. Trial Response Rate (TRR) on MFC20 EP1 Video dataset (each point is an analytic system)

#### Historical Video Detection Performance (Full Data)




#### Historical Video Detection Performance (OptIn)





## Video Temporal and Spatial Localization

### Temporal Localization Scoring Visualization



**Score:**  $MCC = 1 \rightarrow Perfect system$ 

 $MCC = 0 \rightarrow \text{Random system}$ 

 $MCC = -1 \rightarrow Inverted system$ 


**Example:** TP = 2, TN = 8, FP = 4, FN = 2  $MCC = \frac{8}{\sqrt{2880}} \approx 0.15$ 

### Video Temporal Localization Results

- Dataset
  - MFC20-EvalPart1-Video-LocSubset-Ver1
  - video subset with 117 probs
- 7 teams
  - Kitware
  - Purdue\_Polimi
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
  - UMD
  - UNIFI
  - USCISI-TA1.1
  - USCISI-TA1.2
- Condition: Video Only

- Full Data Highest MCC
  - MCC = 0.003
  - Team ID: Kitware
  - System ID: kitwarevideoframeduplication\_2020-03-23T21-23-13f884000
- OptIn Data Highest MCC
  - MCC = 0.004
  - Team ID: SRI-PRNU-TA1
  - sriprita1-vid-mdl-prnubased\_2020-02-07T16-49-46f182000
  - TRR = 0.44

#### A Video Example (House) in MFC20 Evaluation



## Video Spatial-Temporal Localization (VSTL)

#### Task Definition


Video spatial localization task is to determine the spatial edits of a particular video if it is determined (correctly or incorrectly) to be manipulated.

#### Metrics

Optimum Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC)

#### Status


- One container submitted that is capable of VSTL
- Scoring under way




## Video Manipulation Detection Analysis

### Video Detection

#### At least 20 probes




### Effect of Audio Edit on Detection




Audio Edit	Mean Rank
no	1.24
yes	1.76

### Effect of Manipulation Count on Detection




Manipulati on Count	Mean Rank
3	2.02
2	2.39
4	2.48
1	3.11

### Effect of Operation on Detection



Operation	Mean Rank
Sel Cut Frames	4.52
Overlay Object	4.80
Exposure	4.98
Paste Overlay	4.98
Copy Paste	5.00
Time Alt Warp	5.02
Add Audio Smpl	6.02
DF Face Swap	6.07
Paste Sampled	6.67
Sel Crop Frames	6.93

### **Detection Teams**



### Video Special Studies

- Video Studies
  - Frame Drop/Duplication
  - Social Media Laundering Video


- Study Condition Definition
  - Manipulation Detection (MD)
    - Target = Any manipulated video
    - Non-Target = HP media
  - Operation-Only Detection (OOD)
    - Target = Only video with operation of interest; no other operations are present
    - Non-Target = HP media

# Video Manipulation Detection Special Study – Social Media Laundering (Video) Results (MD)


#### 6 Scenarios

- Facebook (DeskDesk) (Synthetic)
  - · desktop upload, desktop download
- Facebook (MobDesk) (Synthetic)
  - mobile upload, desktop download
- Instagram (Synthetic)
  - desktop upload, desktop download
- YouTube (Actual/Manual)
  - desktop upload, desktop download
  - Multiple resolutions
- Anti-Forensic Copy EXIF
  - Original compression
  - Copy original EXIF
- Output Copy
  - No compression
  - No copying EXIF

#### All study probes




# Social Media Factor (MD)



SM Factor	Mean Rank
AF Copy EXIF	2.74
FB-DeskDesk	2.98
FB-MobDesk	3.22
YT	3.37
Output Copy	3.93
IG	4.76

# Resolution (MD)



Resolution	Mean Rank
FB	4.87
Unknown	5.50
240p	6.02
480p	6.22
640p	6.26
720p	6.30
1280p	6.37
320p	6.43
360p	6.98
1080p	7.04
2160p	7.41
IG	8.59



# MediFor Challenge Evaluation 2020 (Provenance Tasks)

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), Dr. Haiying Guan (Co-PI), **Dr. Yooyoung Lee**, Dr. Amy Yates<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin

Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

April 21-25, 2020



### Provenance Outline

- Task definition and performance measure
- Provenance evaluation datasets
- Results and analyses
- Summary

### Provenance Filtering (PF)

- Searching for a potential pool of related images from a large collection of datasets (called the world dataset)
- Given an image (probe), the goal is to return up to N images of the predicted relevant images from the world dataset
- System output
  - JSON file that contains N filtered images including a confidence score that indicates how likely the filtered image is related with respect to the probe image.

### PF Performance Measure

 The recall of first n images from the world dataset sorted by 'confidence score'

$$recall = \frac{|\{relevant\} \cap \{retrieved\}|}{|\{relevant\}|}$$

MFC20 primary metric: Recall@300

### Provenance Graph Building (PGB)

- Constructing the relationships among the retrieved images along with finding the ancestor and descendent sequences
- Given a probe image (e.g., base, donor, intermediate, or final modified images), the goal is to build a provenance phylogeny graph that describe the relationships among the images with the manipulation sequences.
- System Output
  - JSON file that contains both nodes and links with the two types of confidence scores
    - Node: how likely the retrieved image (node) is presented in the provenance graph with respect to the probe image
    - Link: how likely the two nodes (between a source node and a target node) have the relationship (link) in the provenance graph

# Provenance Graph Building (Eval Condition)


- Full graph
  - All images related to the probe image are evaluated with the ancestors and descendants' sequences
- Subset (direct path) graph
  - The subset of the related images (node set) is restricted to ancestors and descendants of the probe image and only directed paths related to the probe image are evaluated

# Example of Full vs Subset Reference Graph

Probe: node marked in green circle

**Full Reference Graph** 

**Subset (Direct Path) Reference Graph** 



### **PGB Performance Measures**

 Evaluation metrics: Graph Similarity and Generalized Fmeasure

• Given the system output provenance graph,  $G_S$ , the set of nodes (or vertices) of the system output provenance graph is  $V_S$  while the set of links (or edges) is  $E_S$ 

- Nodes overlap:  $sim_{NO}(G_r, G_s) = 2 \frac{|V_r \cap V_s|}{|V_r| + |V_s|}$
- Links overlap:  $sim_{LO}(G_r, G_s) = 2 \frac{|E_r \cap E_s|}{|E_r| + |E_s|}$
- Nodes and links overlap:  $|\sin_{\mathrm{NLO}}(G_r, G_s)| = 2 \frac{|V_r \cap V_s| + |E_r \cap E_s|}{|V_r| + |V_s| + |E_r| + |E_s|}$
- Graph color code in HTML measure output

7/8/20

**Green (correct detections)** Red (false alarms) Gray (missed detections)


Node Correctly located images Falsely located images Omitted images

**Link** Correctly linked images Falsely linked images Omitted links




2d93bc609fca8e571a831a1df36bc900.jpg

125




# **Provenance Eval Datasets**

# Provenance Graph Test Data and Reference Generation



### **Provenance Dataset**

NIST Data Sets	Image Probe	Image Journal	World	Date
NC17 EvalPart1	1000	406	1M	06/2017
MFC18 EvalPart1	10,000	641	1M	03/2018
MFC19 EvalPart1	9420	1025	2M	03/2019
MFC20 EvalPart1	5926	1571	2M	02/2020



# Provenance Results and Analyses

### Provenance Filtering Overview

**Algorithm** 

#### **System Input**

Probe Image



#### World Image Set













#### **System Output**

Retrieving a set of N images with confidence score



0.9





0.8






#### **Performance Measure**

The recall of first n images from the world dataset sorted by 'confidence score'

$$recall = \frac{|\{relevant\} \cap \{retrieved\}|}{|\{relevant\}|}$$

Recall@50, Recall@100 Recall@200, **Recall@300** 


# MFC20 Provenance Filtering Results




### Provenance: Factor of Interest

- 6 factors from the reference and journal information
  - Manipulation Count (1 to 8)
  - Face Manipulation (yes/no)
  - GAN (yes/no)
  - Antiforensics (Y: After Antiforensics, N: Before Antiforensics)
  - TargetedOperations (20 different manipulation operations)
  - Team systems (Kitware\_Columbia, Purdue\_NotreDame, USCISI)
- Removed factor settings are less than 70 target trials


# What are the important factors for PF?



#### Main Effects Plot with Error Bars




### **Manipulation Count**



Factor	Avg.Rank
8	2.000000
7	3.000000
2	3.333333
6	3.666667
4	4.333333
5	5.333333
3	6.333333
1	8.000000

- For the PF task, single manipulation is harder to retrieve across the three systems
- USCISI has larger effect on the manipulation count followed by Kitware-Columbia

### Face Manipulation




Y: Face manipulation

N: Non-face manipulation

- The face manipulations are easier to retrieve compared to the non-face manipulations across the three systems
- Face Manipulation has larger effect on all three systems

### **GAN**




Y: GAN manipulation

N: Non-GAN manipulation

- The GAN-based manipulations are harder than the Non-GAN manipulations across the three systems
- All the three systems have large effect on the GAN factor

### Antiforensics




Y: After Antiforensics

N: Before Antiforensics

- The manipulations before Antiforensics are easier than after Antiforensics across the three systems
- All the three systems have large effect on the Antiforensics factor


# Targeted Operations



Factor	Avg.Rank
TransformWarp	1.000000
TransformDistort	2.333333
CGIFill	4.333333
DigitalPenDraw	4.333333
CreativeFilter	5.333333
ContentAwareFill	6.000000
AddNoise	7.666667
PasteSampled	9.000000
Curves	10.000000
ColorBalance	11.000000
TransformResize	11.333333
Exposure	11.666667
ArtificialShadow	13.000000
Blur	13.333333
Levels	13.333333
Saturation	15.666667
SelectRemove	16.000000
LayerOpacity	17.666667
PasteSplice	17.666667
Hue	19.333333

Out of the 20 operations, "TransformWarp" is easier for the PF task across the three systems

### Provenance Filtering Results over Years



Metric: Recall@200

scoring\_dataset\_name

NC17-Eval-Ver1-All

MFC18-Eval-Ver1-Part1

MFC19-EvalPart1-Image-Ver1

MFC20-EvalPart1-Image-Ver1

Different systems over years

Different datasets over years

NIST Data Sets	Probe	World
NC17 EvalPart1	1K	1M
MFC18 EvalPart1	10K	1M
MFC19 EvalPart1	9420	2M
MFC20 EvalPart1	5926	2M

### Provenance Graph Building Overview

#### **System Input**

Probe Image



#### World Image Set














#### **System Output**

Constructing a provenance graph that describes the relationships among the images with the ancestor and descendent sequences




#### **Performance Measure**

Node and Edge overlap similarity metric of a provenance graph


#### Generalized F-measure:

- Sim(Nodes Overlap)
- Sim (Links Overlap)
- Sim(Nodes+Links Overlap)
- NodeRecall


### MFC20 Provenance Graph Building Results




# System Output Scoring Examples (high scores)




# System Output Scoring Examples (low scores)




# What are the important factors for PGB?



#### Main Effects Plot with Error Bars



# Face Manipulation




Y: Face manipulation

N: Non-face manipulation

#### **Observations**

- The face manipulations are easier for both Kitware-Columbia and USCISI while there is barely any effect on Purdue\_Notredam
- USCISI has the largest effect on Face Manipulation followed by Kitware-Columbia

#### **GAN**




Y: GAN manipulation

N: Non-GAN manipulation

#### **Observations**

- The GAN-based manipulations are harder for USCISI and Purdue\_Notredam, but easier for Kitware-Columbia
- The GAN factor has higher effect on Kitware-Columbia and USCISI

## Antiforensic




Y: After Antiforensics

N: Before Antiforensics

#### **Observations**

- The manipulations after Antiforensics are easier than before Antiforensics for Kitware-Columbia and Purdue\_Notredam, but opposite for USCISI
- Kitware-Columbia has the highest effect on the Antiforensics factor

## Provenance Graph Building Results over Years



Metric: Sim(NLO)

NC17 MFC18 MFC19 MFC20


Different systems over years


Different datasets over years


NIST Data Sets	Probe	World
NC17 EvalPart1	1K	1M
MFC18 EvalPart1	10K	1M
MFC19 EvalPart1	9420	2M
MFC20 EvalPart1	5926	2M

# **Provenance Summary**

- Provenance filtering (PF) and graph building (PGB) are a challenging task
- For the MFC20 evaluation, Kitware-Columbia has the highest performance for both PF and PGB
- Important factors given the 6 factors are different between PF and PGB
  - Each factor behaves differently between PF and PGB
  - Antiforensic has larger effect on both PF and PGB performance
- Best system results trend over years







# MFC20 Camera Verification Evaluation Results Deep Dive

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), **Dr. Haiying Guan** (Co-PI), Dr. Yooyoung Lee, Dr. Amy Yates<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin

Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

April 21-25, 2020


### Camera ID Verification Outline

- Task definition
- Evaluation data
- Evaluation metrics
- MFC20 result

#### Camera ID Verification Task

- Task: Determine if a probe is from a claimed camera fingerprint.
  - If relevant, determine where the media regions had content changes.

#### **Training Images/Video(s)**



#### Camera ID Verification Evaluation Features

- Objective: how does system perform:
  - with limited training resources
  - matching sensors cross media modality
- Key features
  - Specify training data
  - Support cross modality on training and testing data among image, video, and multimedia
  - Support localization task



#### MFC20 Camera ID Verification Datasets


#### Six datasets:

- 3 training modalities (Image, Video, Multimedia)
- 2 testing modalities (Image, Video)

Test	Train	Probe Pair	Camera	Journal
Image	Image	11288	106	1454
	Video	9346	88	1411
	Multimedia	9346	88	1411
Video	Image	788	35	87
	Video	767	34	87
	Multimedia	767	34	87

# **Detection System Evaluation Metrics**

- Evaluate the accuracy of a system output (e.g., confidence score)
- Evaluation metrics
  - ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic)
  - AUC (Area Under Curve)
  - CD (Correct Detection) @ FAR = 0.05
  - EER (Equal Error Rate)




# Holistic vs. Opt In Technologies

- Allowing Systems to Respond When/If Appropriate
- Evaluation challenge:
  - Some media forensic systems determine a response should not be returned
    - E.g., the video frame size is different with trained model, the image is not with the supported formats, the pixel is saturated etc.

<b>Probe Status</b>	Description
Processed	probe was fully processed
OptOut	the system <u>determined</u> a response should not be returned
OptOutLocalization	the system, <u>determined</u> a detection response but not a localization response should be returned
NonProcessed	A system failure of some kind occurred and will be scored with low probability


- NIST reports:
  - Holistic performance measures: score all trials
  - Opt In performance measures:
    - Trial Response Rate (TRR) Percent of processed, NonProcessed, and FailedValidation images
    - Performance measures excluding opt'd out probes



# Camera ID Verification Subtask: Train and Test On Image


# MFC20 EvalPart1 Train and Test on Image (Full Data)

- 11288 image camera pairs
- 106 cameras models
- 2 teams:
  - Binghamton
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
- Highest AUC system:
  - Team ID: Binghamton
  - AUC = 0.872
  - CD@0.05FA = 0.67
  - System ID: p-bingcamfinghdr20\_1



# MFC20 EvalPart1 Train and Test on Image (Opt In)

- 2 teams:
  - Binghamton
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
- Highest AUC system (OptIn) :
  - Team ID: Binghamton
  - OptIn TRR = 0.95
  - AUC = 0.902
  - CD@0.05FA = 0.698
  - System ID: p-bingcamfinghdr20 1




# Performance Comparison Across Years

- Camera ID Verification Data Set Summary
- Test on image dataset summary

	MFC18			MFC19			MFC20			
Test	Train	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.	Probe Pair	Cam.	Jour.
Image	Image	5275	39	452	8804	73	844	11288	106	1454
	Video	3383	25	410	6845	57	802	9346	88	1411
	Multimedia	3383	25	410	6845	57	802	9346	88	1411


# Camera ID Verification Detection: Train and Test on Image

- Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Full Data)




# Camera ID Verification Detection: Train and Test on Image

- Team Performance Comparison Across Years (OptIn)




4/21-25/20



# Camera ID Verification Subtask: Train and Test On Video

### MFC20 EvalPart1 Train and Test On Video

- 767 video camera pairs
- 34 cameras models
- 1 team:
  - SRI-PRNU-TA1
- 2 systems:
  - Highest AUC = 0.689 (Opt In TRR = 0.17)
  - Highest CD@0.05FA = 0.192
  - Team ID: SRI-PRNU-TA1
  - System ID: sriprita1\_vid\_camv\_L2




# Performance Comparison Across Years

- Camera ID Verification Data Set Summary
- Test on video dataset summary

			MFC18		MFC19			MFC20		
Test	Train	Probe	Cam.	Jour.	Probe	Cam.	Jour.	Probe	Cam.	Jour.
		Pair			Pair			Pair		
Video	Image	289	11	67	351	23	81	788	35	87
	Video	289	11	67	337	22	81	767	34	87
	Multimedia	289	11	67	337	22	81	767	34	87


## Camera ID Verification Detection: Train and Test on Video

- Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Full Data)




## Camera ID Verification Detection: Train and Test on Video

- Team Performance Comparison Across Years (Opt In)



4/21-25/20



# MFC20 Event Verification Evaluation Results Deep Dive

Jonathan Fiscus (Co-PI), **Dr. Haiying Guan** (Co-PI), Dr. Yooyoung Lee, Dr. Amy Yates<sup>+</sup>, Andrew Delgado, Daniel Zhou, Timothee Kheyrkhah, Dr. Xiongnan Jin

Multimodal Information Group, \*Image Group
Information Access Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)


April 21-25, 2020

## **Event Outline**

- Task definition
- Evaluation data
- Evaluation metrics
- MFC20 result

### **Event Verification Task**

 Task: Given a collection of images and videos from the event, determine if a probe is from the claimed event.



#### **Event Verification Task**

 Task: Given a collection of images and videos from the event, determine if a probe is from the claimed event.



#### MFC20 Event Verification Dataset

#### • 12 Events

• 6 hurricane, 3 air show, and 3 others

hurricane\_matthew, hurricane\_sandy, hurricane\_harvey, hurricane\_katrina, hurricane\_lrma, hurricane\_ike, oshkosh2011, oshkosh2010, berlin\_air\_show, berlin\_marathon, chinese\_new\_year\_london\_2014, chicago\_blizzard\_2011.

#### Datasets

- Training: about 200 per event
- Testing: about 50 per event



oshkosh2011



oshkosh2010



hurricane\_katrina



hurricane\_ike



berlin\_marathon



chicago\_blizzard\_
2011

# **Event Verification System Performance**

- Test Data
  - 12 Events
  - 2K training images
  - 574 test pairs
- 1 Team: Mayachitra
- Highest AUC = 0.909
  - CD@0.05FA = 0.533
  - System ID: RN50-sysOut-Dev MFC 18 MFC 19





Figure: MFC20 EP1 Event ROC

## **Event Verification Detection System**

- Team Performance Comparison Across Years





### **Thank You for Your Attention!**

- NIST MediFor Team: medifor-nist@nist.gov
- MediFor Confluence: <a href="https://mediforprogram.com">https://mediforprogram.com</a>
- MediScore Git: <a href="https://gitlab.mediforprogram.com/jfiscus/MediScore">https://gitlab.mediforprogram.com/jfiscus/MediScore</a>
- MediBrowser: <a href="https://medifor.rankone.io/">https://medifor.rankone.io/</a>
- NIST MediFor Data: <a href="https://mig.nist.gov/MFC2019/Resources.html">https://mig.nist.gov/MFC2019/Resources.html</a>